We consider a crowdsourcing model in which n workers are asked to rate the quality of n items previously generated by other workers. An unknown set of αn workers generate reliable ratings, while the remaining workers may behave arbitrarily and possibly adversarially. The manager of the experiment can also manually evaluate the quality of a small number of items, and wishes to curate together almost all of the high-quality items with at most an ǫ fraction of lowquality items. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that this is possible with an amount of work required of the manager, and each worker, that does not scale with n: the dataset can be curated withÕ 1 βα 3 ǫ 4 ratings per worker, andÕ 1 βǫ 2 ratings by the manager, where β is the fraction of high-quality items. Our results extend to the more general setting of peer prediction, including peer grading in online classrooms.
Introduction
How can we reliably obtain information from humans, given that the humans themselves are unreliable, and might even have incentives to mislead us? Versions of this question arise in crowdsourcing (Vuurens et al., 2011) , collaborative knowledge generation (Priedhorsky et al., 2007) , peer grading in online classrooms (Piech et al., 2013; Kulkarni et al., 2015) , aggregation of customer reviews (Harmon, 2004) , and the generation/curation of large datasets (Deng et al., 2009) . A key challenge is to ensure high information quality despite the fact that many people interacting with the system may be unreliable or even adversarial. This is particularly relevant when raters have an incentive to collude and cheat as in the setting of peer grading, as well as reviews on sites like Amazon and Yelp, where artists and firms are incentivized to manufacture positive reviews for their own products and negative reviews for their rivals (Harmon, 2004; Mayzlin et al., 2012) .
One approach to ensuring quality is to use gold sets -questions where the answer is known, which can be used to assess reliability on unknown questions. However, this is overly constraining -it does not make sense for open-ended tasks such as knowledge generation on wikipedia, nor even for crowdsourcing tasks such as "translate this paragraph" or "draw an interesting picture" where there are different equally good answers. This approach may also fail in settings, such as peer grading in massive online open courses, where students might collude to inflate their grades.
In this work, we consider the challenge of using crowdsourced human ratings to accurately and efficiently evaluate a large dataset of content. In some settings, such as peer grading, the end goal is to obtain the accurate evaluation of each datum; in other settings, such as the curation of a large dataset, accurate evaluations could be leveraged to select a high-quality subset of a larger set of variable-quality (perhaps crowd-generated) data.
There are several confounding difficulties that arise in extracting accurate evaluations. First, many raters may be unreliable and give evaluations that are uncorrelated with the actual item quality; second, some reliable raters might be harsher or more lenient than others; third, some items may be harder to evaluate than others and so error rates could vary from item to item, even among reliable raters; finally, some raters may even collude or want to hack the system. This raises the question: can we obtain information from the reliable raters, without knowing who they are a priori?
In this work, we answer this question in the affirmative, under surprisingly weak assumptions:
• We do not assume that there is a "gold set" or other cheap way to judge worker performance; instead, we rely on a small number of our own (potentially noisy) post hoc judgments.
• We do not assume that the majority of workers are reliable.
• We do not assume that the unreliable workers conform to any statistical model; they could behave fully adversarially, in collusion with each other and with full knowledge of how the reliable workers behave.
• We do not assume that the reliable worker ratings match our own, but only that they are "approximately monotonic" in our ratings, in a sense that will be formalized later.
For concreteness, we describe a simple formalization of the crowdsourcing setting (our actual results hold in a more general setting). There are n raters and n items to evaluate, which have an unknown quality level in [0, 1] . At least αn workers are "reliable" in that their judgments match our own in expectation, and they make independent errors. We assign each worker to evaluate at most k randomly selected items. In addition, we ourselves judge k 0 items. Our goal is to recover the β-quantile: the set T * of the βn highest-quality items. Our main result is the following: Theorem 1. In the setting above, suppose k ≥ Ω(1/βα 3 ǫ 4 ) and k 0 ≥ Ω(log(1/αβǫ)/βǫ 2 ). Then, with probability at least 99%, we can identify βn items with average quality at most ǫ worse than T * .
Amazingly, the amount of work that each worker (and we ourselves) has to do does not grow with n; it depends only on the fraction α of reliable workers and the the desired accuracy ǫ. While the number of evaluations k for each worker is likely not optimal, we note that the amount of work k 0 required of us is close to optimal: for α ≤ β, it is information theoretically necessary for us to evaluate Ω(1/βǫ 2 ) items,via a reduction to estimating noisy coin flips (Mannor and Tsitsiklis, 2004) .
Why is it necessary to include some of our own ratings? If we did not, and α < 1 2 , then an adversary could create a set of dishonest raters that were identical to the reliable raters except with the item items r * true ratings 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.1 We observe a small number of ratings from each rater (indicated a blue), which we represent as entries in a matrixÃ (unobserved ratings in red, treated as zero by our algorithm). We also rate a small number of items ourself, indicated byr. Our goal is to recover the set T * representing the top β fraction of items under our rating. As an intermediate step, we recover a matrix M * that approximates the top items for each individual rater.
indices permuted by a random permutation of {1, . . . , m}. In this case, there is no way to distinguish the honest from the dishonest raters except by breaking the symmetry with our own ratings.
Our main result holds in a considerably more general setting where we require a weaker form of inter-rater agreement -for example, our results hold even if some of the reliable raters are harsher than others, as long as the expected ratings induce approximately the same ranking. The focus on quantiles rather than raw ratings is what enables this. Note that once we estimate the quantiles, we can approximately recover the ratings by evaluating a few items in each quantile.
Our technical tools draw on semidefinite programming methods for matrix completion, which have been used to study graph clustering as well as community detection in the stochastic block model (Holland et al., 1983; Condon and Karp, 2001) . Our setting corresponds to the sparse case where all nodes have constant degree, which has recently seen great interest (Decelle et al., 2011; Mossel et al., 2012; 2013b; a; Massoulié, 2014; Guédon and Vershynin, 2014; Mossel et al., 2015; Chin et al., 2015; Abbe and Sandon, 2015; Makarychev et al., 2015) . Makarychev et al. (2015) in particular provide an algorithm that is robust to adversarial perturbations, but only if the perturbation has size o(n); see also Cai and Li (2015) for robusness results when the node degree is logarithmic.
Several authors have considered semirandom settings for graph clustering, which allow for some types of adversarial behavior (Feige and Krauthgamer, 2000; Feige and Kilian, 2001; Coja-Oghlan, 2004; Krivelevich and Vilenchik, 2006; Coja-Oghlan, 2007; Makarychev et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2014; Guédon and Vershynin, 2014; Moitra et al., 2015; Agarwal et al., 2015) . In our setting, these semirandom models would need to assume that the adversaries are strictly dominated by the reliable raters, in the sense of having lower expected accuracy on every item; this is implausible as it rules out most types of strategic behavior. In removing this assumption, we face a key technical challenge: while previous analyses consider errors relative to a ground truth clustering, in our setting the ground truth only exists for rows of the matrix corresponding to reliable raters while the remaining rows could behave arbitrarily even in the limit where all ratings are observed. This necessitates a more careful analysis, which helps to clarify what properties of a clustering are truly necessary for identifying it.
Algorithm and Intuition
We now describe our recovery algorithm. To fix notation, we assume that there are n raters and m items, and that we observe a matrixÃ ∈ [0, 1] n×m :Ã ij = 0 if rater i does not rate item j, and otherwiseÃ ij is the assigned rating, which takes values in [0, 1] . In the settings we care aboutÃ is very sparse -each rater only rates a few items. Remember that our goal is to recover the β-quantile T * of the best items according to our own rating.
Our algorithm is based on the following intuition: the reliable raters must (approximately) agree on the ranking of items, and so if we can cluster the rows ofÃ appropriately, then the reliable raters should form a single very large cluster (of size αn). There can be at most 1 α disjoint clusters of this size, and so we can manually check the accuracy of each large cluster (by checking agreement with our own rating on a few randomly selected items) and then choose the best one.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for recovering β-quantile matrixM using (unreliable) ratingsÃ.
1: Parameters: reliable fraction α, quantile β, tolerance ǫ, number of raters n, number of items m 2: Input: noisy rating matrixÃ 3: LetM be the solution of the optimization problem (1):
where · * denotes nuclear norm. 4: OutputM . Algorithm 2 Algorithm for recovering an accurate β-quantile T from the β-quantile matrixM .
1: Parameters: tolerance ǫ, reliable fraction α 2: Input: matrixM of approximate β-quantiles, noisy ratingsr,r ′ 3: Let C ′ be the set of αn indices i ∈ [n] for which jM ijrj is largest.
One major challenge in using the clustering intuition is the sparsity ofÃ: any two rows ofÃ will almost certainly have no ratings in common, so we must exploit the global structure ofÃ to discover clusters, rather than using pairwise comparisons of rows. The key is to view our problem as a form of noisy matrix completion -we imagine a matrix A * in which all the ratings have been filled in and all noise from individual ratings has been removed. We define a matrix M * that indicates the top βm items in each row of A * : M * ij = 1 if item j has one of the top βm ratings from rater i, and M * ij = 0 otherwise (this differs from the actual definition of M * given in Section 4, but is the same in spirit). If we could recover M * , we would be close to obtaining the clustering we wanted.
The key observation that allows us to approximate M * given only the noisy, incompleteÃ is that M * has low-rank structure: since all of the reliable raters agree with each other, their rows in M * are all identical, and so there is an (αn) × m submatrix of M * with rank 1. This inspires the low-rank matrix completion algorithm for recoveringM given in Algorithm 1. Each row of M is constrained to have sum at most βm, and M as a whole is constrained to have nuclear norm M * at most
Recall that the nuclear norm is the sum of the singular values of M ; in the same way that the ℓ 1 -norm is a convex surrogate for the ℓ 0 -norm, the nuclear norm acts as a convex surrogate for the rank of M (i.e., number of non-zero singular values). The optimization problem (1) therefore chooses a set of βm items in each row to maximize the corresponding values inÃ, while constraining the item sets to have low rank (where low rank is relaxed to low nuclear norm to obtain a convex problem). This low-rank constraint acts as a strong regularizer that quenches the noise iñ A.
Once we have recoveredM using Algorithm 1, it remains to recover a specific set T that approximates the β-quantile according to our ratings. Algorithm 2 provides a recipe for doing so: first, rate k 0 items at random, obtaining the vectorr:r j = 0 if we did not rate item j, and otherwiser j is the (possibly noisy) rating that we assign to item j. Next, score each rowM i based on the noisy ratings jM ijrj , and let T 0 be the average of the αn highest-scoringM i . Finally, use randomized rounding to turn the vector T 0 ∈ [0, 1] m into a discrete vector T ∈ {0, 1} m , and treat T as the indicator function of a set approximating the β-quantile (see Section 5 for details of the rounding algorithm).
In summary, given a noisy rating matrixÃ, we will first run Algorithm 1 to recover a β-quantile matrixM for each rater, and then run Algorithm 2 to recover our personal β-quantile fromM .
Possible attacks by adversaries. In our algorithm, the adversaries can influenceM i for reliable raters i via the nuclear norm constraint (note that the other constraints are separable across rows). This makes sense because the nuclear norm is what causes us to pool global structure across raters (and thus potentially pool bad information). In order to limit this influence, the constraint on the nuclear norm is weaker than is typical by a factor of 2 ǫ ; it is not clear to us whether this is actually necessary or due to a loose analysis. (Note that M * C -M * restricted to the reliable rows-has nuclear norm √ αβnm, since it is the αn × βm all-1s matrix padded by zeros; the constraint on M * must be at least 1 α times as large as this since the adversaries could produce 1 α permuted copies of M * C .) The constraint j M ij ≤ βm is not typical in the literature. For instance, place no constraint on the sum of each row in M (instead of recovering the β-quantile, they normalizeÃ to lie in [−1, 1] m×m and recover the items with a positive rating). Our row normalization constraint prevents an attack in which a spammer rates a random subset of items as high as possible and rates the remaining items as low as possible. If the actual set of high-quality items has density much smaller than 50%, then the spammer gains undue influence relative to honest raters that only rate Algorithm 3 Algorithm for obtaining (unreliable) ratings matrixÃ and noisy ratingsr,r ′ .
1: Input: number of raters n, number of items m, and ratings per rater k. 2: Initially assign each rater to each item independently with probability k/m. 3: For every rater assigned more than 2k items, un-assign items until there are 2k remaining. 4: For every item assigned to more than 2k raters, un-assign raters until there are 2k remaining. 5: Have the raters submit ratings of their assigned items, and letÃ denote the resulting matrix of ratings with missing entries fill in with zeros. 6: Generate each ofr andr ′ by rating items with probability k0 m (fill in missing entries with zeros) 7: OutputÃ,r, andr ′ e.g. 10% of the items highly. Normalizing M to have a fixed row sum prevents this; see Section B for details.
Assumptions and Approach
We now state our assumptions more formally, state the general form of our results, and outline the key ingredients of the proof. In our setting, we can query a rater i ∈ [m] and item j ∈ [m] to obtain a ratingÃ ij ∈ [0, 1]. Let r * ∈ [0, 1] m denote the vector of true ratings of the items. We can also query an item j (by rating it ourself) to obtain a noisy ratingr j such that E[r j ] = r * j . Let C ⊆ [n] be the set of reliable raters, where |C| ≥ αn. Our main assumption is that the reliable raters make independent errors: Assumption 1 (Independence). When we query a pair (i, j), and i ∈ C, we obtain an outputÃ ij whose value is independent of all of the other queries so far. Similarly, when we query an item j, we obtain an outputr j that is independent of all of the other queries so far.
Note that Assumption 1 allows the unreliable ratings to depend on all previous ratings and also allows arbitrary collusion among the unreliable raters. In our algorithm, we will generate our own ratings after querying everyone else, which ensures that at leastr is independent of the adversaries.
We need a way to formalize the idea that the reliable raters agree with us. To this end, for i ∈ C let A * ij be the expected rating that rater i assigns to item j. We want A * to be roughly increasing in r * :
Definition 1 (Monotonic raters). We say that the reliable raters are (L, ǫ)-monotonic if
whenever r * j ≥ r * j ′ , and for all i ∈ C and all j, j
The (L, ǫ)-monotonicity property says that if we think that one item is substantially better than another item, the reliable raters should think so as well. As an example, suppose that our own ratings are binary (r * j ∈ {0, 1}) and that each ratingÃ i,j matches r * j with probability In general, the monotonicity property is fairly mild -if the reliable ratings are not (L, ǫ)-monotonic, it is not clear that they should even be called reliable! Algorithm for collecting ratings. Under the model given in Assumption 1, our algorithm for collecting ratings is given in Algorithm 3. Given integers k and k 0 , Algorithm 3 assigns each rater at most 2k ratings, and assigns us 2k 0 ratings in expectation. The output is a noisy rating matrix A ∈ [0, 1] n×m as well as noisy rating vectorsr,r ′ ∈ [0, 1] m (we need to create two independent rating vectors for technical reasons; in practice we can use a single vector). Our main result states that we can useÃ andr to estimate the β-quantile T * ; throughout we will assume that m is at least n. . Then, with probability 1 − δ, Algorithms 1 and 2 recover a set T satisfying
Note that the amount of work for the raters scales as m n . Some dependence on m n is necessary, since we need to make sure that every item gets rated at least once.
The proof of Theorem 2 can be split into two parts: analyzing Algorithm 1 (Section 4), and analyzing Algorithm 2 (Section 5). At a high level, analyzing Algorithm 1 involves showing that the nuclear norm constraint in (1) imparts sufficient noise robustness while not allowing the adversary too much influence over the reliable rows ofM . Analyzing Algorithm 2 is far more straightforward, and requires only standard concentration inequalities and a standard randomized rounding idea (though the latter is perhaps not well-known, so we will explain it briefly in Section 5).
RecoveringM (Algorithm 1)
The goal of this section is to show that solving the optimization problem (1) recovers a matrixM that approximates the β-quantile of r * in the following sense:
Proposition 1. Under the conditions of Theorem 2, Algorithm 1 outputs a matrixM satisfying
where T * j = 1 if j lies in the β-quantile of r * , and is 0 otherwise.
Proposition 1 says that the rowM i is good according to rater i's ratings A * i . Note that (L, ǫ 0 )-monotonicity then implies thatM i is also good according to r * . In particular (see A.2 for details)
Proving Proposition 1 involves two major steps: showing (a) that the nuclear norm constraint in (1) imparts noise-robustness, and (b) that the constraint does not allow the adversaries to influenceM C too much. (For a matrix X we let X C denote the rows indexed by C and X C the remaining rows.)
In a bit more detail, if we let M * denote a denoised version ofM , and B denote a denoised version ofÃ, we first show (Lemma 1) that B,M − M * ≥ −ǫ ′ for some ǫ ′ determined below. This is established via the matrix concentration inequalities in Le and Vershynin (2015) . Lemma 1 already suffices for standard approaches (e.g., Guédon and Vershynin, 2014) , but in our case we must grapple with the issue that the rows of B could be arbitrary outside of C, and hence closeness according to B may not imply actual closeness betweenM and M * . Our main technical contribution, Lemma 2, shows that
that is, closeness according to B implies closeness according to B C . We can then restrict attention to the reliable raters, and obtain Proposition 1.
Part 1: noise-robustness. Let B be the matrix satisfying
n×m by R ij = T * j . Ideally, we would like to have M C = R C , i.e., M matches T * on all the rows of C. In light of this, we will let M * be the solution to the following "corrected" program, which we don't have access to (since it involves knowledge of A * and C), but which will be useful for analysis purposes:
Importantly, (6) enforces M * ij = T * j for all i ∈ C. Lemma 1 shows thatM is "close" to M * : 
Note thatM is not necessarily feasible for (6), because of the constraint M C = R C ; Lemma 1 merely asserts thatM approximates M * in objective value. The proof of Lemma 1, given in Section A.3, primarily involves establishing a uniform deviation result; if we let P denote the feasible set for (1), then we wish to show that | Ã − B, M | ≤ 1 2 ǫαβkn for all M ∈ P. This would imply that the objectives of (1) and (6) are essentially identical, and so optimizing one also optimizes the other.
Using the inequality | Ã − B, M | ≤ Ã − B op M * , where · op denotes operator norm, it suffices to establish a matrix concentration inequality bounding Ã − B op . This bound follows from the general matrix concentration result of Le and Vershynin (2015) , stated in Section A.1.
Part 2: bounding the influence of adversaries. We next show that the nuclear norm constraint does not give the adversaries too much influence over the de-noised program (6); this is the most novel aspect of our argument.
Suppose that the constraint on M * were not present in (6). Then the adversaries would have no influence on M * C , because all the remaining constraints in (6) are separable across rows. How can we quantify the effect of this nuclear norm constraint? We exploit Lagrangian duality, which allows us to replace constraints with appropriate modifications to the objective function.
To gain some intuition, consider Figure 2 . The key is that the Lagrange multiplier Z C can bound the amount that B, M can increase due to changing M outside of C. If we formalize this and analyze Z in detail, we obtain the following result:
Then with probability at least 1 − δ there exists a matrix Z with rank(Z) = 1, Z F ≤ ǫk αβn/m such that
By localizing B, M * − M to C via (8), Lemma 2 bounds the effect that the adversaries can have onM C . It is therefore the key technical tool powering our results, and is proved in Section A.4. Proposition 1 is proved from Lemmas 1 and 2 in Section A.5.
Recovering T (Algorithm 2)
In this section we show that ifM satisfies the conclusion of Proposition 1, then Algorithm 2 recovers a set T that approximates T * well. Formally, we show the following:
Proposition 2. Suppose Assumption 1 holds and k
. With probability 1 − δ, Algorithm 2 outputs a set T satisfying
The validity of this procedure hinges on two results. First, establish a concentration bound showing that jM ijrj is close to k0 m jM ij r * j for all i ∈ C, which implies that the αn best rows ofM according tor also look good according to r * . This yields the following lemma: . Then, with probability 1 − δ, we have
See Section A.6 for a proof. The idea is to establish a uniform bound showing that
is small for any set of αn rows S, and hence that greedily taking the αn best rows according tor is almost as good as taking the αn best rows according to r * . We improve over a naïve union bound by exploiting power mean inequalities on cumulant functions.
Having recovered a set C ′ of good rows, define their average
We need to turn T 0 into a binary vector so that Algorithm 2 can output a set; we do so via randomized rounding, obtaining a vector T ∈ {0, 1} m such that E[T 0 ] = T . Our rounding procedure is given in Algorithm 4; the following lemma, proved in A.7, asserts its correctness: Find j such that u + z ∈ [s j−1 , s j ).
⊲ if no such j exists, skip the next step 7:
end for 9:
return T 10: end procedure
The remainder of the proof involves lower-bounding the probability that T is accepted in each stage of the while loop in Algorithm 2. We refer the reader to Section A.8 for details.
Open Directions and Related Work
Future Directions On the theoretical side, perhaps the most immediate open question is whether it is possible to improve the dependence of k (the amount of work required per worker) on the parameters α, β, and ǫ. It is tempting to hope that when m = n a tight result would have k = Θ log(1/α) min(α,β)ǫ 2 , in loose analogy to recent results for the stochastic block model (Banks and Moore, 2016) .
Our results also leave some open questions for variations on our setting. One concerns the regime where m ≪ n: in this case, can we get by with much less work per rater? Another question concerns adaptivity: if the choice of queries is based on previous worker ratings, can we reduce the amount of work? We would be quite interested in answers to either question.
Related work.
Our setting is closely related to the problem of peer prediction (Miller et al., 2005) , in which we wish to obtain truthful information from a population of raters by exploiting inter-rater agreement. While several mechanisms have been proposed for these tasks, they typically assume that rater accuracy is observable online (Resnick and Sami, 2007) , that raters are rational agents maximizing a payoff function (Dasgupta and Ghosh, 2013; Kamble et al., 2015; Shnayder et al., 2016) , that the workers follow a simple statistical model (Karger et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2014; , or some combination of the above .
The work most close to ours is Christiano (2014; , which studies online collaborative prediction in the presence of adversaries; roughly, when raters interact with an item they predict its quality and afterwards observe the actual quality; the goal is to minimize the number of incorrect predictions among the honest raters. This differs from our setting in that (i) the raters are trying to learn the item qualities as part of the task, and (ii) there is no requirement to induce a final global estimate of the high-quality items, which is necessary for estimating quantiles. It seems possible however that there are theoretical ties between this setting and ours, which would be interesting to explore.
A Deferred Proofs

A.1 Matrix Concentration Bound of Le and Vershynin (2015)
For ease of reference, here we state the matrix concentration bound from Le and Vershynin (2015) , which we make use of in the proofs below. Theorem 3 (Theorem 2.1 in Le and Vershynin (2015) ). Given an s × s matrix P with entries P i,j ∈ [0, 1], and a random matrix A with the properties that 1) each entry of A is chosen independently, 2) E[A i,j ] = P i,j , and 3) A i,j ∈ [0, 1], then for any r ≥ 1, the following holds with probability at least 
where d ′ is the maximum ℓ 2 norm of any row or column of A ′ , and C is an absolute constant.
Note: The proof of this theorem in Le and Vershynin (2015) shows that the statement continues to hold in the slightly more general setting where the entries of A are chosen independently according to random variables with bounded variance and sub-Gaussian tails, rather than just random variables restricted to the interval [0, 1].
A.2 Details of Lipschitz Bound (Equation 5)
The proof essentially consists of matching up each value r * j , for j ∈ T * , with a set of values r * j ′ , j ′ ≥ j, where the correspondingM i,j ′ sum to 1; we can then invoke the condition (2). Unfortunately, expressing this idea formally is a bit notationally cumbersome.
Before we start, we observe that the Lipschitz condition (2) implies that, if r *
It is this form of (2) that we will make use of below. Now, let I j = I[j ∈ T * ], and without loss of generality suppose that the indices j are such that
where h(τ, v) = ∞ if no such j exists. We observe that for any vector v ∈ [0, 1] m , we have
where we define r * ∞ = 0 (note that the integrand is therefore 0 for any τ ≥ v 1 ). Hence, we have
which implies (5). The key step is (i), which uses the fact that h(τ, I) ≤ h(τ,M i ) (because I is maximally concentrated on the left-most indices of [m]), and hence r * h(τ,I) ≥ r * h(τ,Mi)
.
A.3 Stability Under Noise (Proof of Lemma 1)
By Hölder's inequality, we have that | Ã −B, M | ≤ Ã −B op M * . We now leverage Theorem 3 to bound Ã − B op . To apply the theorem, first note that from the construction ofÃ given in Algorithm 3,Ã can be constructed by first having the raters rate each item independently with probability k/m to form matrixÃ o and then removing ratings from the "heavy" rows (i.e. rows with more than 2k ratings), and "heavy" columns (i.e. columns with more than 2k) ratings. By standard Chernoff bounds, the probability that a given row or column will need to be "pruned" is at most e −k/3 ≤ 2/k, and hence from the independence of the rows, the probability that more than 5n/k rows are "heavy" is at most e −2n/3k . The probability that there are more than 5n/k heavy columns is identically bounded.
Note that the expectation of the portion ofÃ o corresponding to the reliable raters is exactly the corresponding portion of matrix B, and with probability at least 1 − 2e −2n/3k , at most 10n/k rows and/or columns ofÃ o are pruned to formÃ. Consider padding matricesÃ and B with zeros, to form the n × n matricesÃ ′ and B ′ . With probability 1 − 2e −2n/3k the conditions of Theorem 3 now apply toÃ ′ and B ′ , with the parameters d = nk m ≤ k, and d ′ = 2k. Hence for any r ≥ 1, with
for some absolute constant C.
Hence setting r = log(1/δ), and
m/n ǫ 4 α 3 β for some absolute constant C ′ , we have that with probability at least 1 − δ, we have
and | Ã − B, M * | is bounded identically.
To conclude, we have the following:
which completes the proof.
A.4 Bounding the Effect of Adversaries (Proof of Lemma 2)
In this section we prove Lemma 2. Let P 0 be the superset of P where we have removed the nuclear norm constraint. By Lagrangian duality we know that there is some µ such that maximizing B, M
We start by bounding µ. We claim that µ ≤ ǫk αβn/m. To show this, we will first show that B, M cannot get too large. Let E be the set of (i, j) for which ratings are observed, and define the matrix
(ii)
In (i) we used the matrix concentration inequality of Theorem 3, in a similar manner as was used in our proof of Lemma 1. Specifically, we consider padding B and B ′ with zeros so as to make both into n × n matrices. Provided the total number of raters and items whose initial assignments are removed in the second and third steps of the rater/item assignment procedure (Algorithm 3) is bounded by 10n/k, which occurs with probability at least 1 − δ/2 given our choice of k, then Theorem 3 applies with r = log(1/δ), and d and d ′ bounded by 2k, yielding an operator norm bound of r 3/2 (
, that holds with probability 1 − n −r > 1 − δ/2. In αβnm cannot possibly be optimal, since the solution M = 0 would be better. Hence, µ 0 is a large enough Lagrange multiplier to ensure that M ∈ P, and so µ ≤ µ 0 = ǫk αβn/m, as claimed.
We next characterize the subgradient of f µ at M = M * . Define the projection matrix P as
Thus P M = M if and only if all rows in C are equal to each other. In particular,
The following lemma says that without loss of generality we can assume that P G = G: We can further note (by differentiating f µ ) that G = B − µZ 0 , where Z 0 op ≤ 1 1 . Then P G = P B − µP Z 0 = B − µP Z 0 . Let r(M ) denote the matrix where M C is replaced with R C (so r(M ) ∈ P 0 ∩ {R C = M C } whenever M ∈ P 0 ). The rest of the proof is basically algebra; for any M ∈ P, we have
(iv)
where (i) is by complementary slackness (either µ = 0 or M * * = 2 αǫ √ αβnm); (ii) is concavity of f µ , and the fact that B − µP Z 0 is a subgradient; (iii) is the property from Lemma 5 ( B − µP Z 0 , r(M ) − M * ≤ 0 since r(M ) ∈ P 0 ); and (iv) is because M and r(M ) only differ on C.
To finish, we will take Z = µ(P Z 0 ) C . We note that
Moreover, Z has rank 1 and so Z F = Z op ≤ µ ≤ ǫk αβn/m, as was to be shown.
Proof of Lemma 5. First, since P M = M for all M ∈ P 0 ∩ {M C = R C }, and P M * = M * , we
We thus only need to show that P G is still a subgradient of f µ . Indeed, we have (for arbitrary M )
where (i) is because G ∈ ∂f µ (M * ), and (ii) is because projecting decreases the nuclear norm. Since the inequality
is the defining property for P G to lie in ∂f µ (M * ), the proof is complete.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 1
In this section, we will prove Proposition 1 from Lemmas 1 and 2. We start by plugging inM for M in Lemma 2. This yields
On the other hand, we have
Putting these together, we obtain
Scaling ǫ by a factor of 1 + √ 2 yields the desired result.
A.6 Concentration Bounds forr (Proof of Lemma 3)
We start by stating a lemma which will be useful both here and later:
min(ǫ,ǫ 2 ) , with probability 1 − δ, we have
Given Lemma 6, the rest of the proof is fairly straightforward. Noting that ǫ ≤ 1 and applying this conclusion for v = αn, and k 0 ≥
, we see that
as was to be shown.
Proof of Lemma 6. Define the cumulant function
where (i) is Bennet's inequality.
We also consider the cumulant function for the maximum average deviation over possible sets V :
To bound C v (λ), we use the power mean inequality
Therefore,
≤ log n v exp (e λ − λ − 1)βk 0 (56) = log(n/v) + (e λ − λ − 1)βk 0 .
By applying a standard Chernoff bound argument to C v (λ), we obtain
In particular, for k 0 ≥ 3 log(2n/vδ) β min(ǫ,ǫ 2 ) , we have with probability 1 − δ that 1 |V | i∈V D i ≤ ǫβk 0 for all sets V ⊆ [n] with |V | ≥ v, as was to be shown.
A.7 Correctness of Randomized Rounding (Proof of Lemma 4)
Our goal is to show that the output of Algorithm 4 satisfies E[T ] = T 0 . First, observe that since (T 0 ) j ≤ 1 for all j, each interval [s j−1 , s j ) has length at most 1, and so the for loop over z never picks the same index j twice. Moreover, the probability that j is included in T 0 is exactly s j −s j−1 = (T 0 ) j . The result follows by linearity of expectation. 
B Examples of Adversarial Behavior
In this section, in order to provide some intuition we show two possible attacks that adversaries could employ to make it hard for us to recover the good items. The first attack creates a symmetric situation, whereby there are 1 α indistinguishable sets of potentially good items, and we are therefore forced to consider each set before we can find out which one is actually good. The second attack demonstrates the necessity of constraining each row to have a fixed sum, by showing that adversaries that are allowed to create very dense rows can have disproportionate influence on nuclear normbased recovery algorithms
B.1 Necessity of Nuclear Norm Scaling
Suppose for simplicity that α = β and n = m. Let J be the αn × αn all-ones matrix, and suppose that the full rating matrix A has a block structure: matrix A * might look like (with α = 2 5 , β = 1 6 , n = 10, m = 12): 
The nuclear norm of each individual bad block is 3 2 αβnm, and because the blocks are chosen independently of each other, the nuclear norm will be approximately additive across blocks. In addition, including a given bad block increases Ã − 1 2 J, M by 3 4 αβnm. In contrast, including the good block increases the nuclear norm by √ αβnm and only increases the objective by 1 2 αβnm. The bad blocks therefore all give more "bang for the buck" in terms of how much they increase the objective vs. how much much they increase the nuclear norm, so we will add them before the good block.
To accomodate all these bad blocks, we need to allow M * to be at least roughly αβnm , which is adds an extra factor of 1 β relative to when we constrain the column sum. The issue can be seen in the above construction in (69): if we do not normalize the rows, then the rows controlled by adversaries can exert disproportionate influence (up to a factor of 1 β ) by creating columns that are much denser than those of the reliable raters.
